Abstract
Introduction
Most systems t h a t can possibly be hazardous t o life, property or well-being have a safety system as a subcomponent. Safety systems are used to detect and/or prevent unsafe operating conditions. Safety systems are also used to mitigate the consequences of accidents. Safety systems can be as complex as avionics control on advanced aircraft or as simple as a home smoke detector; avionics safety systems should both detect and prevent unsafe operating conditions while simple smoke detectors only detect hazards.
Many of the systems currently i n use guard against hazards w i t h safety systems using methods t h a t do not rely on digital hardware and accompanying software. A large number of these safety systems are being replaced with new technology t h a t uses programmed digital components. These components are proposed for b o t h new construction and preventive maintenance on deteriorating, older systems. Modern digital systems have many features t h a t suggest their use i n safety systems: selfdiagnostic aids, on-line testing, high accuracy, drift-free operation, signal multiplexing, and the use of fiber optics.
While the hardware reliability and quality have increased, the use of software increases the risk of errors and failures. This is due to the complexity of software and the difficulty of validating it against any possible error. T h e nuclear power, avionics and medical device control industries face a common set of problems in development and assurance o f high integrity software [lO] .
Software quality assurance (SQA) auditors are faced with assessing the quality and integrity of software in the general system and the safety system. Guidance developed for software quality assurance provides some checklists that may be used during audits [9] . However, standards and guidelines on the best practices for producing high integrity software are not widely available; the contents of such standards are n o t yet i n agreement [9] . T h e investigation of software safety is itself a new field; the discipline has not matured sufficiently t o offer profound advice.
In this paper, we show a novel application of program slicing t o t w o issues of software safety: functional diversity, and validation and verification o f safety critical components. W e start with the work of Leveson in software fault tree analysis [5] and build on our own labors i n program slicing to give SQA auditors more methods to assuage the inherent difficulties o f their task. W e have begun to prototype these methods as a research project a t National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST).
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The Problem
A comprehensive classification of error types would be a potent weapon i n the auditor's arsenal; the auditor could simply validate against the list. Such a classification could also guide new methods of development so that a class of errors is n o t even injected into the product. T h e construction of this classification requires empirical error data from finished projects. To collect this data, software development organizations need a data base t h a t contains information on the cause and cure of individual errors. However, most software development organizations have insufficient capability to collect this data, let alone use it. Moreover, an investigation of software error analysis has shown that, in general, industrywide error data (for any industry) is n o t sufficient t o assist developers or to alert auditors to the types of problems that may exist i n the safety system under audit [8] . Thus we are reduced to collections of ad-hoc methods for detection and assurance.
Auditors are faced with hard choices of how to use tools to assess software i n safety systems. The functional capability provided by CASE tools is generic, rather than specific. Thus, the SQA auditor would need the same tool and all the products o f the developer, and need t o do additional work, to apply any tool's capability to the quality analysis. W e propose i n this work t o provide a software tool and method t h a t is specifically designed and constructed w i t h the task of the auditor as the driving force.
A design error i n hardware or software, or an implementation error in software may result i n a Common Mode Failure o f redundant equipment. A common mode failure is a failure as a result of a common cause, such as the failure of a system caused by the incorrect computation of an algorithm. For example, suppose that X and Y are distinct critical outputs and that X measures a rate of increase while Y measures a rate of decrease. If the computation o f both of the rates depends on a call to a common numerical differentiator, then a failure in the differentiator can cause a common mode failure of both measures.
One technique to defending against common mode fai I u res uses functional diversity. Fun ct iona I diversity in design is a method of addressing the common mode failure problem i n software that uses multiple algorithms o n independent inputs. Functional diversity allows the same function to be executed along two or more independent paths. For example, a function may be computed manually and with automation. Alternatively, versions of the same program may be written by different teams [3] . Within a software system, the same function may be programmed i n more than one way, but eventually a voting mechanism within the software decides what output t o accept. T h e value of functional diversity for software is debated i n the technical literature and some experiments have been conducted to find a valid approach [3] . For software, functional diversity may be used to ensure t h a t no two critical functions use the same paths f r o m input to output. Thus, an error in one critical function can never impact the output of another critical function.
Fault Tree Analysis

System Fault Tree Analysis
Once the system hazards have been identified, the objective is to mitigate the risk t h a t they will occur. One approach t o achieving this objective is to use system fauit tree analysis. Under the assumption t h a t there are relatively few unacceptable system states and t h a t each of these hazards has been determined, the analysis procedure is as follows. T h e auditor assumes t h a t a hazard has occurred and constructs a tree with the hazardous condition as the root. T h e next level of the tree is an enumeration o f all the necessary preconditions for the hazard t o occur. These conditions are combined w i t h logical and and or as appropriate. Then each new node is expanded "similarly until all leaves have calculable probability or cannot be expanded for some reason" [5] .
T h e system fault tree analysis gives the auditor the sub-components o f the system t h a t must be carefully examined. Part of this examination is the validation t h a t there are no interactions with non-critical functions. T h e determination of the specific components t h a t will be examined is up to the auditor. This information should be obtainable f r o m the design documentation. The task of locating the components is outside the scope of this paper.
Software Fault Tree Analysis
T h e results of system hazard analysis must be examined for their impact on software. T h e level of detail available a t the software requirements or software design phases may n o t be sufficient to fully understand potential hazards and some critical information may be overlooked i n the development of the design and code. Once code is available, the equivalent of system fault tree analysis can be applied to the software.
"Software fault-tree analysis works backward from the critical control faults . . . through the program code or the design to the software inputs. In other words, it starts f r o m the hazardous outputs (or lack of them) and traces backward t o find paths through the code f r o m particular inputs to these outputs or t o demonstrate that such paths do not exist" [5] . This is the particular feature of the auditor's job t h a t is suited to program slicing.
Program Slicing
Program slicing is a family of program decomposition techniques based on extracting statements relevant t o a computation in a program. Program slicing as originally defined by Weiser [12] produced a smaller program that would reproduce a subset of the original program's behavior. This is advantageous since the code for a given calculation may be scattered throughout a program. Because the slice is smaller than the original program and the slice collects an algorithm without intervening irrelevant statements, it should be easier for anyone (developer, maintainer or auditor) interested in a subset o f the program's behavior to understand the slice that produces the behavior of interest rather than to deal with the entire program. This idea has applications in program debugging, program testing, parallel program execution and slice, if an input (i.e., conceptual assignment) is eliminated, the corresponding input ualue is also deleted from the input sequence. So, to get the same value in a given variable a t a given point, we may need to slice the input, too.
Dynamic program slicing was introduced by Korel as a method to significantly reduce the size o f static slices [4] . Dynamic slices are useful in debugging and testing. Dynamic slices are computed f r o m a program trajectory for some particular, fixed input. Several programming language features that are handled in a general way by static slicing can be handled effectively by dynamic slicing. These features include arrays, structures and dynamic objects (pointers), which can only be handled in a general way by static slicing so t h a t many apparently irrelevant statements are included i n a static slice. The extra information provided by knowledge of the inputs permits static slices t o be pared down to only those statements were executed the individual data objects t h a t were that were used. For example, a static slice t h a t references an array component would then require t h a t all references t o any component be included in the slice. T h e dynamic slice permits the individual array component t o be treated as an independent data object; thus only references t o the particular component need to be included in the slice. Which components are accessed is a function of the particular input. A static slice is independent of any input.
A decomposition slice captures all the computation on a given variable without regard to any specific program location by taking the union of all static slices on a given variable a t all output statements[2]. Decomposition slices are useful for software maintainers, as appropriate combinations of decomposition slices can indicate to the maintainer which statements and variables can be modified without impacting the components t h a t are t o remain unchanged.
Slices exhibit a number of useful properties t h a t can be exploited by SQA auditors:
1. Program 
T h e union of t w o slices is a slice with a slicing criterion t h a t is the union of the respective slicing
criterions. This property is exploited in the definition of a decomposition slice.
A program can be viewed as the union of decomposition slices of each output variable.
Any statement not in the union of all decomposition slices must be useless code i n the sense t h a t it does not contribute to the calculation of any program output. Since no-ops inserted for timing would not do not contribute t o the value o f a variable, they would not be included i n a slice. There is no theory o f slicing for asynchronous events, i.e., interrupts.
The intersection of t w o slices is a slice with a slicing criterion t h a t is related to the intersection of the respective slicing criterions.
Using intersections, a slice can be further partitioned into t w o parts, a backbone slice, the union of all intersections w i t h other slices, and the set of statements not included in the backbone slice (called the residual set).
One typically tries t o understand a program by a combination of reading program text, reading program documentation, ad hoc testing with different inputs, and dynamic tracing. Program documentation gives a high
level picture of what is going on, but is usually not directly useful i n code understanding. Ad hoc testing can give a clear understanding of what is happening, but it depends on careful input selection for useful results. Dynamic tracing shows exactly how a given result is produced, but produces a deluge of information which must then be understood. Reading program text also shows exactly how a given result is produced, but again one can be overwhelmed with details that have nothing to do w i t h the task a t hand.
Program slicing addresses this information overload problem in three ways:
1.
A static program slice extracts all the statements t h a t might be relevant to a computation.
2. A dynamic program slice extracts all the statements t h a t are relevant to a computation for a given set of inputs. 
Using Slicing as an Aid to Validating Safety
W e now show how to meld these various ideas into a coherent whole. First, the auditor uses system fault tree analysis to locate critical components. T h e software that is invoked when a hazardous condition occurs is identified in the system. T h e auditor then locates the software variables that are the indicators of unsafe conditions. Program slices are extracted on these "interesting" variables; i.e., slices are extracted using the variable(s) o f interest a t the points where the hazards should be detected. Soflwure fault tree analysis is used on these slices. These slices can be used to validate that there are n o interactions between critical components or with non-critical components. In other words, the backbone slices of safety critical components w i t h any other component must be empty.
Diversity Assurance
The applications of slicing to soflware fault tree analysis are straightforward. In the simplest use, a static program slice will yield all inputs t h a t any variable uses for its computation, so it can be used to validate diversity may prove t h a t both conditions cannot occur together (although the functional diversity of such computations is suspect).
These program projections can also be highlighted for more vigorous analysis, inspection and testing. A static program slice can be further refined by examining the trajectory of specific inputs through the program: we can use a dynamic slice to observe individual instances of the computation. This simplifies the tedious task of the auditor and permits undivided attention to be focused on the analytic portions o f the audit.
Example Using Unravel
T h e u t i l i t y o f a slicing tool comes from automating the task o f finding statements t h a t are relevant t o a computation. W i t h o u t any tool, the SQA auditor evaluating functional diversity would examine the program under consideration until outputs were identified that should be computed independently. T h e auditor would then try to verify independence by reading code.
Unravel is a static program slicer, currently under developoment a t NlST as part o f a research project. Once a variable is identified as interesting, the SQA auditor directs a slicer to compute a program slice on the variable. Instead of examining the entire program, only the statements in the slice need to be examined by the auditor.
As an example, consider the program of figure 4. The program has four inputs, red, green, blue and yellow, and four outputs, sweet, sour, salty, and bitter. The four inputs might be sensor readings and the four outputs might be control device activations.
T o determine the code t h a t is executed when critical control variable sweet is activated the auditor would compute a slice on sweet. Lines 14, 16, 19 and 20 would be identified as members of this slice. T h e Unravel display of this is in figure 5 . With no more uses of red, the dynamic slice is complete and we have determined t h a t outputs sweet and sour depend on red.
B y constructing a slice-based model of the program, the auditor can observe t h a t output sweet depends on the inputs red and green, output sour also depends on red and green, salty depends on blue and yellow, and bitter depends on yellow and green. 6 
Conclusion
W e have presented a novel application of program slicing t h a t aids software quality assurance auditors in the validation of safety critical code f r o m a functional diversity perspective. While this approach does not solve all the problems that an auditor faces, it does ameliorate those which are amenable t o computation. . . 
